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A b stra c t
Euclidean Automata have been introduced in Kornai [Kor14a] to model a phe­
nomenon known as “being in conflicted states” . This brief note gives a further 
look on Euclidean Automata and takes the first steps in studying skeleta and 
representability and the logical characterization of languages accepted by Eu­
clidean Automata.
K eyw ord s: E u c lid ea n  A u to m a ta , S k ele ta .
1 In trod u ction
Euclidean A utom ata (EA) has been introduced, m otivated and further studied in 
[Kor14a] and [Kor14b]. EA are slight generalizations of the classical finite state  
au tom ata: EA can take continuous param eters as input and are used in [Kor14a] to  
analyze the situation of being in a conflicted state. Intuitively, being in a conflicted 
sta te  is modeled by an EA not as a single sta te  (of the EA) but ra ther as a set 
of “nondeterm inistic” states th a t are represented as overlapping parts of the input 
param eter space. Let me recall the precise definition of Euclidean A utom ata.
D e f in it io n  1.1 ([Kor14b]). A Euclidean autom aton (EA) over a param eter space 
£  is defined as a 4-tuple (Q, I ,  F, a)  where Q ç  2s  is a finite set of states given as 
subsets of £ ; I  ç  Q is the set of initial states; F  ç  Q is the set of accepting states; 
and a  : £  x Q ^  Q is the transition  function th a t assigns for each param eter setting 
v G £  and each sta te  q G Q a next sta te  a(v,  q) th a t satisfies v G a(v,  q). □
In [Kor14a] the EA is called determ inistic if q n  s =  0 for different q, s G Q 
and complete if UqeQq =  £ . Throughout we will work w ith complete E A ’s only, the 
reason is th a t for v G £  — UqeQq the condition v G a(v , q) does not make sense, hence
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either one keeps a  to  be undefined on certain  input param eters v or switches to  an 
equivalent EA with param eter space UqeQQ. For simplicity we assume throughout 
th a t the set of initial states I  contains a unique sta te  which we denote by s t a r t .  If 
one perm its several initial states he needs to  complicate the results accordingly. In 
applications drawn in [Kor14a, Kor14b] the alphabet £  consists of vectors from a 
continuous param eter space, typically Rn , however it also makes sense to  consider 
the definition of an EA when £  is a finite set, especially if one considers skeleta of 
E A ’s, as we do in Section 2 .
A typical application in [Kor14a] is the heap (Sorites paradox) presented in the 
Sainsbury and W illiamson [SW95] manner: Consider the line segment [0,1] colored 
so th a t the left-hand region is red, and there is a very fine, continuous, gradual 
change of shades reaching the right-hand side region th a t is colored yellow. The line 
is covered by a tiny window th a t exposes only a small region. We move the window 
very slowly starting  from the left-hand side towards right and after each move one 
is asked about the color of the segment exposed by the window. B ut the window is 
so small relative to  the line segment th a t in no position can you tell the difference 
in color between w hat you can see a t the two sides of the window. It seems th a t 
you m ust call every region red after every move, and thus you find yourself in the 
paradoxical situation calling a yellow region red.
2 S keleta  and rep resen tab ility
Kornai modeled the heap paradox by an EA in a similar m anner as we do below 
(to make life easier we give a somewhat simplified model, but the differences are 
inessential for the sake of the example). L e t’s say [0, | ] is ‘clearly red ’, [f , 1] is 
‘clearly yellow’ and [| , | ] is this ‘hard to  tell, orange’ range. Our EA will have 2 
states: red (R) and yellow (Y ) respectively w ith R =  [0, f ] and Y =  [| , 1]. Note 
th a t the two states overlap exactly in the ‘problem atic’ region. S tarting from the 
red sta te  the machine gets input from the continuous param eter space £  =  [0, 1]. 
The machine is defined as follows:
a (v ,R )  =  (  R if V £ [° ' 3] , a (v ,Y ) =  (  Y if V e  [ 1 ' 1]
[ Y otherwise. [ R otherwise.
In figure:
V e  [2/3,1]
V e  [0,2/3] V e  [1/3,1]
V e  [0,1/3]
In the entire fuzzy orangish region [3 , 3] the model shows hysteresis: if it came from 
the red side it will ou tpu t red, if it came from the yellow side it will ou tpu t yellow.
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To get a be tter understanding of how EA works, Kornai hints a t skeletonizing E A ’s. 
The skeleton of an EA is defined in [Kor14b] as follows.
D e f in it io n  2.1 ([Kor14b]). The skeleton of an EA is a standard  FSA whose alphabet 
corresponds to  canonical representatives from each Boolean atom  of Q. □
In the determ inistic case (where all the states of the EA are disjoint) there is 
a correspondence between input letters and autom aton states. However, in the 
nondeterm inistic case (where states are not necessarily disjoint) we may not be able 
to  select distinct canonical representatives for each sta te  (or for the Boolean atom s). 
In this case skeleta should be understand as a “subjective EA ” (cf. [Kor14b]). 
The definition seems a bit vague as it is not completely clear how to chose the so 
called canonical representatives (or the subjective representatives), moreover, Q may 
have no Boolean atom s (cf. Exam ple 2.4 below). A key for the clarification is the 
observation th a t some inputs are to ta lly  indistinguishable no m atter w hat sta te  the 
machine is in. To obtain a definition for the general case, fix an EA a  : £  x Q ^  Q 
and for v , w  G £  write
v ~  w (Vq G Q) a(v,q )  =  a(w,q)  (1)
Then ~  is an equivalence relation on £ . Moreover it is a congruence of a  as for any 
input sequences (v i , . . . ,  vn ) and (w i , . . . ,  wn ), vi ~  Wi implies
a ( v i , . . . , v n , s t a r t )  =  a (v n , a (v n -1 (- ■ ■ ,a ( v 1, s t a r t ) ) ) )  (2)
=  a (v n ,a ( v n - i ( - •• , a (w i, s t a r t ) ) ) )  (3)
=  ••• (4)
=  a ( w i , . . . , w n , s t a r t )  (5)
After this preparation we can redefine the concept of skeleta as follows.
D e f in it io n  2.2. The skeleton of the EA a  : £  x Q ^  £  is the standard  FSA 
a  : £ / ^  x Q ^  Q defined by the equation
<5(v/~, q) =  a (v , q)
Since ~  is a congruence, a  is well-defined. □
If we apply Definition 2.2 to  the heap example given above we end up in the finite 
sta te  machine figured below, which, unsurprisingly, is exactly the FSA sketched 
in [Kor14a]. (Here the input letters r, y  and o stand for red, yellow and orange, 
respectively)
y
r  y
o o
Skeleton in the Euclidean closet 4
Observe th a t £ / ^  is always finite. This is because the original EA has finitely 
many states only, hence we can have a finite num ber of possibilities not to  fulfill 
a (v , q) =  a(w , q) for input letters v, w. This results in a finite num ber of equivalence 
classes of ~ . Unfortunately, a  is no longer an EA as Q £  . It would be handy
to  define the skeleton of an EA as another EA over the finite alphabet £ / ^  by 
letting Q /^  =  (q /^  : q G Q} where q /^  =  ( v /^  : v G q}. However, the autom aton 
ß  : £ / ^  X Q /^  ^  Q /^  defined in the obvious m anner ß ( v /^ ,q /^ )  =  a (v ,q ) /^  is 
not always well defined as the next examples show.
E x a m p le  2.3. Below we give an example for an EA the skeleton of which can be 
represented as an EA. Let the alphabet (param eter space) be £  =  R and the set of 
states is Q =  (R, [0,1]}. Let a  be the EA figured below defined by the equations
, r u f [0, 1] if x  G [0, 1]a (x , R) =  R, a (x , [0,1]) =  <
R otherwise.
x  G R C ®  Î T i^ ^ 0^  x G [ M
The equivalence relation ~  will have two classes: £ / ^  =  ([0 ,1 ],R — [0,1]} =  (a ,b}  
and the skeleton a  looks like
a b — b— a
Since R /^  =  (a, b} and [0 ,1]/^  =  (a}, the skeleton is a EA over Q /^  =  (a, b}:
a, b — b a
E x a m p le  2.4. A small modification on Exam ple 2.3 prevents the skeleton to  be 
represented by an EA. Here £  is as before but Q =  (R , [0,1], [0,2]}. The EA a  is as 
figured below on the left-hand side.
( [ 0, 1] p >  x G [0, 1] M0, 1] V ^  a
x  G [0, g [0, 1] b /  \
x  G R C ® '  x G [0, 1] ©  « -‘ C Q «  b - f g )
The equivalence relation ~  has two classes again: £ / ^  =  ([0,1], R — [0,1]} =  (a , b} 
(note th a t elements of [0,2] — [0,1] behave exactly the same way elements of R — [0,1] 
do). Thus the skeleton can be figured as above on the right-hand side. Note, however, 
th a t Q /^  =  ( (a , b}, (a}}, hence the ‘EA representation’
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y  \ a
does not make sense as one cannot use the same sta te  differently.
The previous two examples raise the question of representability. In this paper 
we could only give a sufficient condition, the general case definitely would require 
non-trivial extra work.
D e f in it io n  2.5. The EA a  : £  x Q ^  Q is said to  be localizable if for every state  
q e  Q there is a param eter V e  £  such th a t V e  q — UreQ,r=qr  (tha t is, V belongs 
only to  the sta te  q). Localizability means th a t every sta te  has an eigenparam eter, a 
param eter which is characteristic of the state. □
In general, a sta te  of a localizable EA can have many different eigenparam eters, 
thus one rather speaks about the set of eigenparam eters associated w ith a given 
state.
P r o p o s i t io n  2.6. Skeleta of localizable EA are isomorphic to  EA.
P ro o f . The idea is th a t if a  is localizable, then  ~  extends to  a congruence of the 
sta te  space Q. T hat is, if we let Q /^  =  (q /~  : q e  Q ) where q /^  =  ( v /^  : V e  q), 
then  the autom aton ß  : £ / ^  x Q /^  ^  Q /^  defined by the equality
ß (v /~ , q /~ ) =  a(v , q ) /^
will be well-defined. As Q /^  ç  2s / ~ , ß  will be an EA.
By localizability for every sta te  q there is a param eter vq, an eigenparam eter 
of q. For two distinct states q and r  the corresponding eigenparam eters cannot be 
~-congruent, because a (v q,q) =  q but q does not contain vr , hence a (v r , q) =  q. 
The same argum ent show th a t a (v q, s) =  q for every sta te  s e  Q. Therefore all 
eigenparam eters associated with a given sta te  are equivalent, and each sta te  can 
be identified w ith th a t equivalence class, th a t is, there is a bijection between Q and 
Q /^ . It follows th a t a (v /^ ,  q /^ )  =  a ( v / ^ , q). Finally, ~  is defined in such a m anner 
th a t a (v ,q ) =  a (w ,q ) whenever v ~  w. Thus a (v /^ ,q )  is well-defined, hence ß  is 
well-defined, too. ■
Exam ple 2.3 shows an EA which is not localizable (the sta te  [0,1] does not have 
an eigenparam eter), still its skeleton can be represented by an EA. This means th a t 
localizability is not necessary for being representable by an EA.
Representation of standard  finite sta te  au tom ata  can be understood (at least) in 
two different ways.
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D e f in it io n  2.7. Let Q be a finite alphabet and R a set of states. The FSA ö : 
Q x R ^  R is representable by an EA if there is EA a  over Q such th a t a  and ö are 
isomorphic.
We say th a t a  is representable in the general sense by an EA if there is a pa­
ram eter space £  D Q and an EA a  over £  such th a t a  \ Q is isomorphic to  ö. □
For an FSA ö : Q x R ^  R and a sta te  s G R let us denote by [s]in the set 
{v G Q : (3p G R)ö(v,p)  =  s}.
P r o p o s i t io n  2.8. Let ö : Q x R ^  R be an FSA with the property th a t there are 
no distinct states s i , s2 G R such th a t [si ]in =  [s2]in. Then ö is representable by an 
EA.
P ro o f . The m apping s ^  [s]in is an isomorphism. ■
E x a m p le  2.9. Consider the following FSA over the alphabet {v ,w ,x}.
w
v w
The sets of incoming edges [si ]in =  {v,x} and [s2]in =  {w ,x} are different, thus 
after replacing si by [si]in we get an isomorphic Euclidean autom aton.
Unfortunately, the condition in Proposition 2.8 is not necessary: one can con­
struct an EA th a t does not satisfy th a t condition. Here is an easy example. Take 
a set S  and a partition  of S  into non-em pty sets S i and S 2. Take S  to  be the 
alphabet and put Q =  {S, S i , S 2} as the set of states. The autom aton is defined by 
a (v , q) =  S  for any v G S  and q G Q. Then [Si ]in =  [S2]in =  0.
C o n n e c t io n s  w i th  h o m o m o rp h is m s . In au tom ata  theory several different types 
of homomorphisms between au tom ata  are defined such as state-hom omorphism , 
alphabet-hom om orphism s, etc. Since states of Euclidean au tom ata  are subsets of 
the alphabet, there is a natural way to  generalize these concepts: homomorphisms 
between Euclidean A utom ata was defined in [Kor14b] as follows.
D e f in it io n  2 .10. A homomorphism from EA a  : £  x Q ^  Q to another EA 
ß  :Q  x S  ^  S  is a m apping h : £  ^  Q such th a t the following stipulations hold.
•  h ( s t a r t a ) =  s t a r t ß  ;
•  h extends to  a m apping h : Q ^  S  in the natural way;
•  h (a (v ^  . . . ,  vn , s t a r t ) )  =  ß (h(vi ) , . . . ,  h(vn), s t a r t ) .
□
Skeleton in the Euclidean closet 7
By Proposition 2.6 skeleta of localizable EA rem ain Euclidean: For a localizable 
EA a  : £  x Q ^  Q the congruence ~  defined by (1) extends to  a congruence of the 
sta te  space Q. T hat is, if we let Q /^  =  (q /^  : q G Q} where q /^  =  ( v /^  : v G q}, 
then  the autom aton ß  : £ / ^  x Q /^  ^  Q /^  defined by the equality
ß (v /~ , q /~ ) =  a(v , q ) /^
is an EA. Let us denote this ß  by a . It is very easy to  check (cf. the proof of 
Proposition 2.6), th a t a  and the skeleton a  defined in 2.2 are isomorphic. Therefore 
we will call a  also a skeleton of a .
Now, if a  is localizable, then  a  is a homomorphic image of a . For, write h(v) =  
v /^ ,  where ~  is the congruence defined by (1). The first two items of Definition 2.10 
follows from the proof of Proposition 2.6 and the th ird  item  is the very definition of 
a  as h ( a ( v ,q)) =  a (v ,q ) /^  =  a ( v /^ ,q /^ ) .
An im portant consequence is th a t localizable E A ’s are categorical objects in 
the sense th a t the class of all such au tom ata  is closed under the homomorphism 
introduced in Definition 2.10, and skeleta form a closed subcategory of the category 
of all localizable EA.
3 L anguages accep ted  by EA
In this section we tu rn  to  a logical characterization of the languages th a t can be 
accepted by EA. Let ö :Q  x R ^  R be a standard  FSA. The language of a  is the 
set L a C Q* defined as
L a =  (w G Q* : ö(w, s t a r t )  =  f in a l} .
This definition clearly makes sense even if Q is infinite. Therefore one can define 
w ithout any difficulty when a Euclidean au tom ata  a  : £  x Q ^  Q accepts a language 
L C £*: if and only if L =  La .
This definition, however, may not be satisfactory enough when £  is infinite. 
The reason is th a t one might like to  say th a t the skeleton of an EA accepts the 
same language as the original EA when restricted to  the language of the skeleton. 
More precisely one can consider the skeleton acting on a subset of the original 
alphabet: pick a representative from each of the equivalence class of the alphabet 
of the skeleton. Then the skeleton and the original EA shows the same behavior on 
each input string. This m otivates the next definition.
D e f in it io n  3.1. Suppose a  : £  x Q ^  Q is an EA, where £  is allowed to  be infinite. 
Let Q C £  be a finite subalphabet and L C Q* a language. Then a  is said to  accept 
L in the general sense if L a \ Q* =  L. □
P r o p o s i t io n  3.2. Each regular language can be accepted in the general sense by 
an EA.
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P ro o f . Let L be a regular language over Q and ö : Q x R ^  R the FSA th a t 
accepts L. By adding new letters to  Q one can reach th a t in this expanded language 
(denote it by £ ) the FSA satisfies [ s ] =  [s']in for all states s, s ' G R by defining the 
action of the new letters carefully. The resulting FSA is representable by an EA a  
applying Proposition 2.8. It is clear th a t L a \ Q* =  L. The proof reveals th a t more 
is true: any language accepted by an FSA over a possibly infinite alphabet can also 
be accepted in the general sense by an EA. If Q is finite then  £  can chosen to  be 
finite; otherwise they can have the same infinite cardinality. ■
It is obvious th a t every language accepted by an EA is regular (because EA 
are special FSA), thus the question of which languages are accepted in the general 
sense is settled. The cheat here is th a t we are allowed to  enlarge the alphabet. Is 
it true  th a t keeping the same alphabet, for every FSA ö : £  x R ^  R there is a 
EA a  : £  x Q ^  Q such th a t L5 =  La ? If the alphabet is finite, then the answer 
obviously is ‘no’. This is because over a finite alphabet £  one can define a t most 
finitely many EA as the set of states Q should be a subset of 2s  which is still finite. 
B ut w hat about the infinite case where one can have any finite num ber of states? 
The answer is still ‘no’ bu t for different reasons: the language th a t contains words 
having odd length (over any alphabet £ ) can be accepted by an FSA but cannot be 
accepted by any EA.
E x a m p le  3.3. No EA can accept the language containing words having odd length.
P ro o f . The language L =  (w G £* : |w| is odd } is accepted by the FSA figured 
below.
Va G £
sta rt —
Va G £
Suppose there is an Euclidean autom aton (Q, I , F, a )  th a t accepts L. The first in­
put letter vi can be any letter from £ , hence after the first transition  a (v i, s t a r t )  =  
qi, the resulting sta te  should q1 should contain v1 by Euclideanity. This means 
q1 =  £ . The second letter v2 is also arbitrary, hence after the second transition  
a (v 2, q1) =  q2 we get similarly th a t q2 =  £ . This means q1 =  q2 and in fact continu­
ing the argum ent one get the conclusion th a t there can be only one sta te  Q =  (£ } . 
B ut such an EA accepts all strings and not ju st the ones having odd length. ■
It is known th a t regular languages are exactly the languages th a t can be defined 
in monadic second order logic [Bu60, El61]. Let us recall some of the basic definitions 
to  make everything clear. Let £  be an alphabet (possibly infinite) and let w =
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( w i , . . . ,  wn) be a word in £*. Such a word can be represented by the relational 
structure
w  =  ({1 , . . . ,  n ) , < w, (QW)ves)
called the word model for w, where < w is the usual ordering on the dom ain of w 
and QW are unary predicates collecting for each letter v e  £  those letter positions 
of w which carry v:
Qw =  ( i : wi =  v)
The corresponding first-order language F O (£ )  has variables x , y , . . .  and built up 
the gram m ar
::= Qv (x) | x <  y | -<£ | ^  V ^  | 3x^>
The language defined by a formula <p is L^ =  (w e  £* : w  |= ^>), where the
satisfaction relation |=  is defined in the usual way. For example the language where 
“every a is immediately followed by a b” can be defined by the formula
Vx(Qa (x) ^  3y(y =  x +  1 A Qb(y)))
where y =  x +  1 has the usual definition x <  y A -3 z (x  <  z A z <  y). A non-example 
could be L =  {a2n : n  e  N ) which is not expressible by a first order formula [Esp12].
M onadic second order logic M S O (£ ) is an extension of first order logic with 
variables X , Y , . . .  ranging over sets of elements of models. The corresponding atomic 
formulas X (x ) are also introduced with the intended meaning “x belongs to  X ” . 
Clearly M S O (£ ) is more expressive th an  F O (£ )  but not vice-versa as the next 
theorem  shows:
T h e o re m  3.4  (Büchi [Bu60], Elgot [El61]). A language (over a finite alphabet) is 
recognizable by a finite sta te  autom aton if and only if it is M SO (£)-definable, and 
both  conversions, from autom ata  to  formulas and vice versa, are effective.
Thus, regular languages are exactly the monadic second order definable lan­
guages. However, examples suggests th a t languages accepted by Euclidean au tom ata  
are first order definable:
E x a m p le  3.5. For £  =  ( a )  we must have Q ç  (0, ( a ) )  and thus there are exactly 
two non-isomorphic EA, figured below
start —*► a s ta rt —^ --------a------► a
The languages accepted by the au tom ata  are L i =  {an : n  >  0) and L 2 =  {an : 
n  >  1). B oth languages are definable in the language F O (£ ) , respectively by the 
formulas VxQa (x) and 3xQ a (x) A VxQa(x).
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E x a m p le  3.6. For £  =  {a, b} the num ber of variations is larger than  before as 
Q Ç {0, {a}, {b}, {a,b}} gives more possibilities. We will not draw all the non­
isomorphic E A ’s here, but one can check easily th a t the languages th a t can be 
accepted by EA over £  are of the form “all sequences of a ’s and b's +  if we wish we 
can prescribe the first and last le tte r” . For example such an L can contain all words 
starting  w ith an a. In any case a F O (£)-characterization  can be easily given. (As 
we prove next th a t languages accepted by EA are first order definable, we omit the 
details of the ra ther painstaking checking of this claim).
Indeed, we prove th a t languages accepted by Euclidean au tom ata  are FO-definabl<
P r o p o s i t io n  3.7. For every finite alphabet £  there is a corresponding first order 
language F O  such th a t each language accepted by an Euclidean autom aton can be 
defined by a FO -form ula.
P ro o f . Assume (Q, I , F, a )  is a Euclidean autom aton over the finite param eter space 
£ . Take the first order language F O (£ )  described above and expand this language 
by new unary predicates Ri for i <  2|s | . We have to  find a first order formula th a t 
expresses in any given word model w  th a t a  accepts w. The formula in question 
will sta te  the existence of a successful run of the EA. As a  has finitely many state, 
we can enum erate them  by Q =  {qi : i <  2 |s |}. Each sta te  qi of the EA will be 
encoded by the predicate R i . We need to  express the followings: (1) in each tu rn  
the machine can be only in one state; (2) the starting  sta te  is qo; (3) if we are in 
position x and the next position is y, then  we applied one of the letters, i.e. for one 
of the v G £  we have Qv (x), and thus the next sta te  should be the one prescribed 
by a (v , qi) =  qj ; (4) the last position is a final state . Thus a  accepts w if and only if
w  |= ( Ą  V x-(R i(x ) A R j(x)) ) (6)
i=j
A V x ( f ir s t(x )  ^  R0(x)) (7)
A VxVy(x =  y +  1 ^  ^  (R i(x) A Qv(x) A R j(y))) (8)
a(v,qi)=qj
A V x (la s t(x )  ^  ^  (R i (x) A Qv(x))) (9)
(3qeF )a(v,qi)=q
Since the em pty word satisfies this sentence, if a  does not accept the em pty word, 
then  a corresponding clause such as 3x(x =  x) should be added. f i r s t ( x )  and 
l a s t ( x )  are respectively the formulas -3 y (y  <  x) and -3 y (x  <  y). ■
If the alphabet £  is not finite, then  a similar argum ent shows th a t languages 
accepted by EA can be defined by first order formulas th a t are allowed to  contain 
infinite disjunctions having an infinite vocabulary (i.e. we use the logic F O œw).
Recall th a t finiteness is a property th a t cannot be expressed in first order logic. 
Indeed, by the compactness theorem  if a formula holds in all finite models, then  it
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should also hold in an infinite model. This can be seen as one of the m ain reasons 
why languages th a t can be accepted by finite sta te  au tom ata  cannot be defined in 
first order logic (and one needs monadic second order logic). Even if the alphabet is 
fixed, an FSA can have an arb itrary  finite num ber of states and we do not have any 
control, in term s of first order logic, over the num ber of states. As we already seen, 
there are only finitely many EA over a finite alphabet. T ha t is, if we fix the alphabet, 
then  there is a fixed upper bound on the possible num ber of states, depending only 
on the size of the alphabet. This allows us to  bypass the problem of non-definability 
of finiteness: using first order logic it is easy to  define models having size at most n, 
for a fixed finite num ber n. This is the key for Proposition 3.7.
As we already mentioned, there are only finitely many EA over a finite alphabet. 
Therefore not every first order definable language can be accepted by an EA (there 
are infinitely many first order definable languages). Then w hat is the logic th a t is 
exactly as expressible as Euclidean autom ata? As the num ber of states is limited, 
the set of EA do not have any extensive closure property (such as closed under direct 
product, unions, etc). This suggests use the vague idea th a t EA are not logical in 
the sense of expressibility. Of course it is not clear how to  define ‘logicality’ in a 
precise m anner.
A ck now ledgem ent
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